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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL PROWS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, BERGIN BRUNSWIG COMPANY, and ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16456

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Plaintiff pursuant to the
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act seeking recovery for an alleged
job-related accident.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
A hearing was held on January 4, 1979 before an Ad.ministrative Law Judge.

The Judge denied compensation to Plaintiff.

Subsequently on April 11, 1979 the Industrial Commission concurred with the Judge and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Review.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirrnance of the Industrial Commission's
Order denying benefits to Plaintiff.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Court will not interfere with Orders of the Industrial Conunission unless they appear contrary to law or contrary to evidence.

Savage v. Industrial Commission, 565 P.2d

782 (Utah 1977); Section 35-1-84, U.C.A.

I f there is any sub-

stantial evidence in the record to support the findings of the
Commission and ultimate facts found by the Commission support the award, this Court cannot do otherwise than enter judg·
ment affirming the award of the COI!lIIlission.

Amalgamated Sugar

Co. v. Industrial Commission, 189 P.69 (Utah 1918).

See also

McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial Conunission (filed July 16,
1979).

This Court must therefore view the evidence concerning

this claim from a standpoint supportive of the Commission's
findings.

Peka Spring co., Inc. v. Jones, 371 N.E.2d 389 (Ct.

App. Ind. 1978).
Because of the preceding standards of review, Defendants
take exception to parts of Plaintiff's "Statement of Facts"
as tending to omit evidence in support of the Commission's find·
ings while tending to exaggerate or incorrectly state evidence
favorable to Plaintiff's position.

For this reason, Defendants

would offer the following Statement of Facts as supportive of
the Conunission's findings.
The plaintiff had been employed at Defendant Bergin Bruns·
wig for approximately 2 months.

( R.' p. 23) .

He was employed

as a truck driver which included loading and unloading me
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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supplies and delivering them to various doctors and hospitals.
(R., p. 20).
On March 3, 1978 the plaintiff was so employed as a truck
driver.

At that time he was some 40 days short of being 22

years old.

(R., p. 4).

In the mid afternoon of that day Plain-

tiff was loading boxes from a handcart in his truck.
28).

(R., p.

As he was loading he was hit by an elastic band which had

been flipped by a co-employee.

(R., p. 29).

The rubber band

was used to wrap medical boxes delivered by the plaintiff and
was some 12 inches long and 3/8 inches wide.

(R., p. 47).

Plaintiff testified that upon being hit he picked up the
elastic band and flipped it back.

He then was hit with two

more elastic bands again flipped by two fellow employees.

At

this point one of the employees approached him with an 18-inch
piece of wood which had been ripped off of a wooden pallet and
came towards him playing as though it were a sword.

(R., p. 21).

Plaintiff grabbed the wood from his co-employee, placed an elastic between the handles of his hand truck and used the elastic
as a "flipper" to propel the wood piece into the air.

In doing

so, he flipped the wood piece into his own right eye.

(R., P· 30).

Plaintiff stated that his flipping of the piece of wood
was not a reaction back to the person who had flipped him with
the elastic but was rather a playful jesture of Plaintiff attempting to flip the wood into the air -with no target intended.

Pp. 29-30).
I

I

!
..._

(R.,

He stated that while he got into the playful mood
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because of the activity of the other employees in flipping
elastics, he quite openly admitted that his injury resulted
from his own act and that he was the aggressor as far as flip(R., p. 33).

ping the wood.

David Chipman, one of the other employees involved in the
incident, testified on behalf of Plaintiff that on the day in
question he and another employee began to playfully flip rubber bands.

He stated that they were being flipped at a dis-

tance where nobody could get hurt with them.

He recalled that

after flipping several elastics he began to resume work when
he saw the plaintiff flip a board in the air which hit Plaintiff in the eye.

(R., pp. 36-37).

Plaintiff characterized playful skirmishes with rubber
bands as a frequent occurrence.

(R., p. 21).

Plaintiff was

not sure exactly when or how often such play occurred but
thought that there were rubber band skirmishes once a day although there were some days where there was no play.

(R., P·

1

22) •

Mr. Gary Leavitt, Operation Manager of Bergin Brunswig,
testified that he was the supervisor of the plaintiff.
41-42).

(R., Pf· i

He related that he had, at times, seen elastics flippe;

by the employees but that the bands being flipped were at a dis·
tance where no harm could be done (R.

I

at he would
P. 47) and th
.

always verbally warn the employees not to engage in sue
(R.,

p. 43).

h activ1:

Ile stated that his job was to cover the whOle
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warehouse, that he was not aware of rubber band fighting as a
daily occurrence, and that at the most he only observed such
activity two or three times a month.

(R.

I

pp. 46-48).

Mr. Leavitt had never seen any of the employees using rubber bands as a bow and arrow for flipping pieces of wood or
any other objects.

(R., p. 48).

He had never given permission

to use the elastics for such a bow and arrow purpose.
48).

(R.

I

p.

Neither had he given permission to use elastics for any

purpose nor was it any employee's function to flip elastics in
the business.

(R., p. 44).

The plaintiff acknowledged that

flipping elastics was not the assigned duty of any employee ineluding himself.

(R.

I

p. 29) •

A claim for compensation was filed against the defendants
and accordingly a hearing was held on January 4, 1979 before an
Administrative Law Judge.

The Judge subsequently entered his

"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order" finding that
the plaintiff was engaging in "horseplay" at the time of his accident so his accident did not arise out of nor was it within
the scope of his employment.

(R.

I

pp •. 85-87).

A Motion for Review was filed by Plaintiff and denied by
the Industrial commission on April 11, 1979 with the Commission
adopting the Judge's findings except for a minor error refer-

.

ring to a non-existent medical panel report.

(R.

I

p. 97) •

Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Review on May 9,
197 9

compensation.
denial
commission's
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided byof
the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DENIED COMPENSATION TO PLAINTIFF SINCE THE INJURY DID NOT
"ARISE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF" PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT.
The Administrative Law Judge in his Findings of Fact statE:
the following:
4.
The horseplay was not related in any
way to the performance of the applicant's
job duties but rather represents a complete
abandonment of the employee's duties. At
the time of the accident neither the applicant nor any of the other employees involved
in the horseplay were carrying out their assigned tasks.
5.
The applicant has failed to prove that
his accident arose out of or was in the
scope of his employment.
(R., p. 87).
It is a well established rule in Utah that the Findings
Conclusions of the Industrial Commission are binding upon this
Court if there is credible, competent evidence to support them.
Whitmore v. Calavo Growers of California, 499 P.2d 848 (Utah
1972); Utah Packers Inc. v. The Industrial Commission of Utah,
469 P.2d 500 (Utah 1970).
Thus, the findings of the Commission must be adhered to
by this Court unless Plaintiff can show there is no evidence
to support them.

In addition, Plaintiff must further show that'

the Commission failed to follow the law in Utah concerning
"horseplay" injuries.

A review of the record and of the appli·
-6-
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cable law reveals that Plaintiff is unable to meet either of
these requirements.
A.
The Industrial Commission's Findings and Conclusions
are Based Upon Substantial Evidence.
Plaintiff claims in his brief that the Industrial CoI!1Illission substantially deviated from the evidence by making inaccurate and incomplete findings.

(Plaintiff's brief, pp. 11-14}.

Plaintiff has failed, however, to support such claim in his
brief with specific instances where such findings are inaccurate
and has therefore waived any such challenge.

In re Lavelle's

Estate, 248 P.2d 372 (Utah 1953).
Plaintiff argues that the failure to refer this matter to
a medical panel constitutes reversible error in light of this
Court's decision in Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d
616 (Utah 1979).

Obviously, the facts in that case and the

facts in this case are entirely distinguishable.
In Lipman the sole issue was whether job-caused stress induced injury or death in such a manner as to be compensable.

As

this Court stated:
The findings of a medical panel may assist in
determining whether the death was caused by
accident~
Id. at 618.
In the instant case, however, there is no doubt as to the
cause of the injury which is simply Plaintiff's own action in
Projecting the wooden spear into the air.

The convening of a

medical panel in such a case would serve no purpose since, as a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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matter of law, the Connnission accepted the cause of the injury
but ruled that it did not .come within the statutory requirement
for compensation.
In cases such as this involving denial of claims based
upon matters of law and not upon factual disputes (as to either
the cause of an injury or the extent of an injury) it would
seem that Section 35-1-77, U.C.A. would not apply since there
would be no "medical aspects" of the case.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's assault upon the C01mnission'
I

findings is without merit.

B.
ment."

The Injury Did Not "Arise Out of Plaintiff's Employ·

'

I

Plaintiff admitted that at the time of the accident he was I
!

not performing an assigned duty.

(R., p.

29).

Mr. Leavitt,

Plaintiff's supervisor, also substantiated this fact.

(,R., P·

1

34).
This Court has stated that the words "arising out of" are
I

construed to refer to the origin or cause of the injury.

For an

1

.I
accident to "arise out of employment" a definite and close causo.:
I

relationship is necessary between the injury and the employee
job activities.

M. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Cornmissi~,

189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948).
Plaintiff's injury did not result from his job activity
and therefore did not "arise" from his employment.
by one authority:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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As stated

5

:

'1

It is generally held that no compensation is
under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, for injuries sustained through practical
joking, horseplay, or sportive acts done independently of and disconnected from the performance of any duty of the employment, since
such injuries cannot ordinarily be regarded as
having risen out of the employment within the
meaning of the Act. 82 Am.Jur.2d, Sect. 314,
p. 105.
(Emphasis added).
~ecoverable

On the other hand, a non-participating victim who is performing his job and is injured by a prank of a co-employee is
deemed to have suffered the injury arising out of his employment since he was injured while performing his job.

Pacific

Employers Insurance Company v. Industrial Accident Commission,
158 P.2d 9 (Cal. App. 1936); Swift and Co. v. Forbus, 207 P.2d
251 (_Okla. 1950).

The evidence is clear that Plaintiff was not performing an
assigned job function at the time of the accident.

It is equally

clear that whether Plaintiff be termed an "aggressor".or not he
was definitely a participant in the horseplay and was not an
innocent "non-participant" who was injured by the acts of others.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's injury is not compensable
as "arising out" of his employment.

c.

The Injury Did Not 11 Arise in the Course of Plaintiff's
Employment."
The words "in the course of" employment have been defined
by this Court to refer to the time, place, and circumstances un-

der which the injury occurred.

This Court has stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In other words the requirement that the accident arise in the course of the employment is
satisfied if it occurs while the employee is
rendering service to his employer which he was
hired to do or doing something incidental
thereto, at the time when and the place where
he was authorized to render such service. M.
& K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 189
P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948).
This Court has stated that when an employee interrupts or
breaks the continuity of his employment for purposes of his ow
whether for recreation or pleasure, and the accident happens
before he brings himself back into the line of his employment,
the injury resulting is not compensable because it does not
occur in the course of his employment.

Sullivan v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 10 P.2d 924 (Utah 1932).
Many states have adopted the so-called "Aggressor Defense
which states that when an employee affirmatively instigates
horseplay or other frivolous activity that the employee steps
aside from his employment and any injuries occurring are noncompensable.

See 1-A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec·

tion 23.30, pp. 5-126 to 5-128.

Defendants submit that the

adoption of this test in Utah allows an objective and reliable
method of determining when "horseplay" prevents recovery.

sue

an adoption would eliminate the need to subjectively evaluate
a number of factors and would thus create a workable and constant standard.

Another approach to the "horseplay" defense is offered by
the noted authority, Professor Arthur Larson in his treatise.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Larson states that where an active participant or instigator
is involved, the question is solely whether the horseplay constitutes a departure from course of employment and he proposes
that the following four elements should be considered in answering that question:
1.
The extent and seriousness of the deviation,
2.
The completeness of the deviation (i.e.,
whether it was comingled with the performance
or involved an abandonment of duty},
3.
The extent to which the practice of
horseplay had become an accepted part of the
employment,
4.
The extent to which the nature of the employment may be expected to include some such
horseplay.
1-A Larson, Workmen's Compensation
Law, Section 23, pp. 5-122.
It still remains for the fact finder to evaluate and weigh
each element individually and collectively to determine the extent of the deviation.

No set formula exists as to how many

of these elements are necessary for compensation to be denied.
Even applying this more liberal test, however, to the facts
of this case still supports the determination of the Commission
that no compensable injury occurred.
1.

The Extent and Seriousness of the Deviation.

There is no question here that Plaintiff was an active participant in the elastic flipping that led to the accident.
testified that just prior to the accident he had flipped one
elastic at a co-employee and that he used another elastic to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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He

span the handles of his hand truck.

(R. , p . 2 9 ) .

He then

grabbed the wooden stick, used the elastic as a bow, and
flipped the piece of wood into the air for no reason except
to be "playful."

(R., pp. 30, 33).

Of course, there is no

way of knowing how long this activity would have continued but
for the injury.
The California Appellate Court in the recent case of Hodge;
v. Worker; s Col"lpensation Appeals Board, 147 Cal.2d 546 (Cal.
App. 1978) held that a car salesman who walked out of a door ar.:
began to box with another salesman was not entitled to compensation for injuries suffered in the horseplay.

The applicant i:.

that case argued that the conduct was so insubstantial of a deviation that the injury occurred within the course of employmen:
as a matter of law.

The California Court rejected this conten-

tion and noted that even though the horseplay lasted only fora

brief period of time and did not occur off of the employer's pn
mises there was ample evidence to show that the deviation from
employment was complete and substantial.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Horn v. Broadway Garage, 99
P.2d 150 (Okla. 1940) held that an employee who placed a broken
paper clip on a rubber band and shot it into his eye could not
recover under the compensation law since his act was disconnected from his employment activities.
Al though the extent and seriousness of the deviation would
have been greater had Plaintiff chased the other employees
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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0 f'
-

,,,,,,,,

of the premises or continued the attack for a JO-minute period,
the substance of the abandonment from his assigned task would
still be no different.
2.

Completeness of Deviation.

When an employee horseplays in the form of a whimsical
method of performing his assigned duties an insubstantial deviation has occurred.

In other words, when an employee is re-

quired to go to a time clock but does so by racing a co-employee,
the deviation is minor since the activity involves a job-related
assignment.

Larson, Section 23.62(A), p. 5-143.

This rule has been basically recognized by this Court in
M. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission where it was held

that only in cases where an act or service which an employee is
performing at the time of accident is itself prohibited (as distinguished from the manner in which an act is done or a service
is performed) does the violation of the statutory provision or
rule take the employee from the "course of employment" within
the meaning of the compensation Act.

189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948).

In this case, clearly, the act of flipping elastics or
wooden pieces was not a mere deviation of an assigned task but
was an abandonment of the work itself.
Larson also observed the following additional test:
If the primary test in horseplay cases is deviation from employment, the question whether
the horseplay involved the dropping ~f active
duties calling for claimant's attention as
distinguished from a mere killing of time while
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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claimant had nothing to do assumes considerable importance. There are two reasons for
this:
first, if there were no duties to be
performed, there were none to be abandoned·
and second, it is co!lllllon knowledge, embodi~d
in more than one old saw, that idleness breeds
mischief, so that if idleness is a fixture of
the employment, its handmaiden mischief is
also.
Larson, Section 23, 65, p. 5-157.
(Emphasis added).
·Again, the testimony is clear that Plaintiff was working
at the time the incident began and had to abandon his work in
order to engage in the elastic band battle.

(R.' p. 28).

Likewise, David Chipman had to interrupt his work in order to
participate.

(R. ,

p. 3 6) •

Clearly, the second criteria under the Larson formula
would dictate denial of coverage.
3.
The Extent to Which the Practice of Horseplay
Had Become an Accepted Part of Employment.
In the absence of actual knowledge and condonation by the
employer, the prime requisite is that the particular horseplay
involved was engaged in so frequently or habitually that it hac
become customary and might fairly be said to be a regular inci·
dent of the employment.

Hodges v. Worker's Compensation Appeal

Board, 147 Ca. Rptr.2d 546

(Cal. App. 1978).

In considering whether or not the horseplay giving rise
to the injury had become an accepted part of the employment,
one must look to the testimony given at the hearing.

1\lthough

the plaintiff and one of his co-employees testified that elasti
· f iec
band flipping was a frequent occurrence, Mr. Leavitt testi
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that he only had observed this activity two or three times a
month.

(R., pp. 22, 36, 43).

The Commission had the right

to believe or disbelieve the witnesses and the acceptance by
the Commission of conflicting evidence cannot be reviewed on
appeal.

Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. Industrial Com-

mission, 266 P. 721 (Utah 1928).
David Chipman stated that the flipping of the bands was
always at a distance where "nobody gets hurt with them."
p. 36).

(R.,

Mr. Leavitt likewise stated that the flipping he ob-

served was at a distance where it would not be harmful.

(R.,

p. 47).

Most importantly, Mr. Leavitt stated that he had never
seen any employee using rubber bands as a bow and
pel other objects.

(R., p. 48).

a~row

to pro-

Neither was there a showing

by the plaintiff that such a practice was customary.
In addition, Mr. Leavitt stated that each time he observed
the elastic flipping he had asked the employees to stop.
company did not condone such activity.

The

In any event, however,

the activity which Mr. Leavitt saw was not the dangerous activity which caused the injury in this case.
The Hodges case is again analogous to this situation.

In

that case there was evidence that employees had frequently engaged in throwing a football or tennis ball.

There was some

evidence that the employer was aware of this practice.

However,
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the employees had never engaged in a sparring boxing match
and the clabnant hbnself testified he did not think that that
kind of activity would be allowed.

147 ca. Rptr. 546.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that the company somehow
condoned the elastic band flipping practice, it cannot be sale
that it was aware or could have foreseen that the elastic band
flipping would result in 18-inch projectiles being propelled
by the flipper mechanism created by Plaintiff.

Obviously, the

flipping of a large piece of wood at a close distance is a con·
siderably different risk than shooting an elastic band from a
long distance.
For these reasons the third criteria also mandates denial
of compensation.
4.
The Extent to Which the Nature of the Employment
May be Expected to Include Some Such Horseplay.
The fourth factor in Larson's test involves a foreseeabili:
or predictability in the type of activity which is being per·
formed.

In other words, some types of employment will lend th~i

to occurrences which may be considered a part of the employment
generally even when it happens the first time at a particular
job.

As stated by Larson:
For example, if an employer hires a gang of
young boys to pick ripe tomatoes, it needs no
long continued personal tradition to reveal
that sooner or later a tomato will be thrown
and if a new restaurant is set up with a door
through which waiters must pass at close
quarters hundreds of times a day, perhaps the
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employer should be held to know on his very
firs~ day in business ~hat waiters will nudge
and JOstle each other in that doorway, since
that is the experience of the restaurant business generally, even if he himself has not
yet had time to acquire that experience.. Larson, Section 23.42, pp. 5-134 to 5-135.
Larson also notes that Longshoremen, "truck loaders",
ditch diggers, and other workers whose duties are largely a
matter of using their muscles will inevitably prove their boxing and wrestling skills whenever they are not kept busy.

Id.

at p. 5-135.
Certainly, it could be expected that the truck loaders in
this job activity would occasionally perform horseplay in some
physical manner.

However, it is not foreseeable that 22-year-

old men would flip elastics or other projectiles at each other.
It is especially unlikely that any employ.er in this situation
would believe that a person of the age of Plaintiff would do
something so dangerous and foolish as to flip an 18-inch piece
of wood haphazardly into the air.
For these reasons, the fourth criteria of the Larson formula also requires denial of compensation.
In summary, this case can be again likened to the Hodges
decision where the California court there said:
It is true the horseplay lasted but a brief
period cut short by applicant's injury and
that it did not take him off the employer's
premises. However, as the judge correctly
observed in his report and recmmnendation on
the Petition for Reconsideration, which was
adopted by the Board: "There was no cominSponsored
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play, the deviation was complete, there is
no evidence or even any real inference that
the practice of horseplay had become an.accepted part of the employment and there was
certainly no evidence that the nature of
the employment would include any horseplay."
147 Cal. Rptr. at 552-553.
D.

The Cases Cited by Plaintiff are Distinguishable.

Plaintiff cites several cases in support of his
that compensation should be allowed.

positi~

Plaintiff Is reliance upo:,

the Twin Peak's Canning Company case is misplaced.

In that cas

a fifteen-year-old boy was working on the first floor of a can·
nery with another boy.

Their job was to stop cans which were

being dropped down a chute from a second floor.

It was a com·

men occurrence for the boys to ride the elevator to the second

floor numerous tiJnes during the day when a lull occurred during
the work.
On the day of the accident such a lull did occur and the

decedent turned off the elevator while it was halfway between t
floors as a practical joke on his friend who was inside.

Later

in an attempt to reactivate the elevator the decedent was crush
by its upward assent.

The Co.mmission in that case made specific findings that tb

boy was in the course of employment at the tiJne of the accident

This Court noted that just because an employee is not wor~·

ing at his usual duties or directly engaged in anything connec·

ted with those duties does not necessarily prevent him frolil re·
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covering compensation.

The Court then made the following im-

portant distinction:
If during his working hours there are intervals of leisure he may, during such intervals, within reasonable limits, move from
place to place on the premises of the employer.
196 P. at 858 (Emphasis added).
The Court then noted that employees will have the desire to
visit other employees and that this does not remove them from
the course of employment.

The Court then noted:

Every employer understands that, in case boys
of immature years are employed, he is charged
with notice of their natural propensities to
congregate, to cOillillUnicate, and to play with
one another. If, therefore, the employer employs any boys and girls and gives them work
which is not continuous, so that there are intervals of leisure, he must assume that during
such intervals they may seek communion with
their fellow workmen, and he therefore must
govern himself accordingly. Id. at 858.
(Emphasis added) .
Finally, the Court noted that the age of the victim was an
important factor and that "We are here not dealing with an
adult, with a man of mature years and experience, but with a
mere boy without experience and with an abundance of life and
vigor."

And the court concluded by saying, "It is true that in

some of its aspects this may be a borderline case, and if the
deceased had been a man of mature years and experience we might
have reached a different conclusion."

Id. at 859.

Thus, the Twin Peaks case can be distinguished on three
grounds:

first, the findings in that case by the trier of fact
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lthe Industrial COlllIIlissionl found in favor of the employee
while in this case it found against Plaintiff; second, the de·
cedent in Twin Peaks was a boy of 15 years whereas the plaintiff in this case is a man of 22 years; and third, the boy in
Twin Peaks was killed during a lull in the work where he had
no work to perform at the time of the death whereas in this ca:
Plaintiff was actively engaged in work when he abandoned this
work for the elastic band battle.
In any event, the Twin Peaks decision was rendered in 191:
and certainly this Court can now re-evaluate the factors to be
used in deciding whether a "horseplay" accident should be comp1
sable under Utah's existing standards and laws.
Likewise the Cassell, the Kansas City Fiber Box Company,

and Socha cases cited by Plaintiff (Brief, pp. 8-9) were all de

cided between 1921 and 1926' and do not necessarily reflect cur·

rent developments in working conditions and modern-day require·
ments.

In addition, the Socha case deals with an injured emplc

who was a non-participating victim of the horseplay and the ade

quacy of warning was questioned where they were provided by the
employer in English to Polish speaking employees.

Finally, Plaintiff asks that the Workmen's Compensations:
tute be interpreted liberally in his favor.

In answering a si·

milar appeal for liberal construction the Indiana Appellate Coe
noted, "The limits of liberality have already been reached in
the 'horseplay analysis.'"

.
Block v. Fruehauf Trailer
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ision,
iv.---

D·

262 N.e.2d 612 llnd. App. 19691.
CONCLUSION
This Court is compelled by statute and stare decisis to
affirm the Commission's decision if it is support by substantial evidence.

The findings of the Administrative Law Judge, as

corrected, are supported by the evidence.

Plaintiff has failed

to raise these alleged errors and has therefore waived any complaint he may now have.

The medical panel requirement is not

applicable to this case.
Plaintiff himself testified that his activity at the time
of the accident did not "arise from" his employment duties.

It

is obvious, therefore, that the first alternative requirement
of the statute has not been met.
Likewise, Plaintiff cannot be said to have been perfor:ming "in the course of" his employment since his activities removed him from such status.
The plaintiff is neither an "innocent victim'' nor a "boy
of youthful age."

(Plaintiff's brief, p. 10).

Plaintiff at

the time of the injury was the sole participant in the activity
and admitted that, as to the wood flipping, he
sor.

~as

the aggres-

The age of 22 makes the plaintiff a young man who should

have some judgment and wisdom as to dangers inherent in horseplay activities.
.

By being the aggressor, many states would autamatica

11

Y

conclude that Plaintiff was outside his scope of employment.
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Even the more liberal views which analyze the extent of deVla•
·
tion would have to also conclude that Plaintiff withdrew hmself from the scope of his employment.
The extent of his deviation was substantial in that he
abandoned his active work and completely concentrated on the
horseplay activities.

There was no evidence that his employer

approved or was aware of Plaintiff's bow and arrow horseplay
even assuming that the employer was aware of the practice of
flipping elastics from a safe distance.
the employees not to flip elastics.

The employer warned

Finally, there is nothing

inherent in Plaintiff's occupation to suggest that this

ty~~

horseplay would occur.
The cases cited by the plaintiff are readf ly distingui~
able both upon their facts and upon their antiquity since the

law of workmen's compensation is dependent upon the factual cor

text of each case and upon the ever changing concept of employ1
employee relations.
For these reasons, the Order of the Commission denying
compensation should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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